A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis

By Robert F. Kennedy

The same group that met that first morning in the Cabinet Room met almost continuously through the next twelve days and almost daily for some six weeks thereafter. Others in the group, which was later to be called the “Ex Comm” (the Executive Committee of the National Security Council), …

They were men of the highest intelligence, industrious, courageous, and dedicated to their country’s well being. It is no reflection on them that none was consistent in his opinion from the very beginning to the very end. That kind of open, unfettered mind was essential.For some there were only small changes, perhaps varieties of a single idea. For others there were continuous changes of opinion each day; some, because of the pressure of events, even appeared to lose their judgment and stability.

The general feeling in the beginning was that some form of action was required. There were those, although they were a small minority, who felt the missiles did not alter the balance of power and therefore necessitated no action. Most felt, at that stage, that an air strike against the missile sites could be the only course. Listening to the proposals, I passed a note to the President: “I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor.”

(Kennedy 2001, 30-31)

The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in calling for immediate military action.They forcefully presented their view that the blockade would not be effective. General Curtis LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, argued strongly with the President that a military attack was essential. When the President questioned what the response of the Russians might be, General LeMay assured him there would be no reaction.President Kennedy was skeptical. “They, no more than we, can let these things go by without doing something.They can’t, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing. If they don’t take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin.”

The President went on to say that he recognized the validity of the arguments made by the Joint Chiefs, the danger that more and more missiles would be placed in Cuba, and the likelihood, if we did nothing, that the Russians would move on Berlin and in other areas of the world, feeling the U. S. was completely impotent. Then it would be too late to do anything in Cuba, for by that time all their missiles would be operational.

General David M. Shoup, Commandant of the Marine Corps, summed up everyone’s feelings: “You are in a pretty bad fix, Mr. President.” The President answered quickly, “You are in it with me.” Everyone laughed, and, with no final decision, the meeting adjourned.

(Kennedy 2001, 36-37)

In his speech, he emphasized that the blockade was the initial step. He had ordered the Pentagon to make all the preparations necessary for fạrther military action. Secretary McNamara, in a confidential report, had listed the requirements: 250,000 men, 2,000 air sorties against the various targets in Cuba, and 90,000 Marines and Airborne in the invasion force. One estimate of American casualties put the expected figure over 25,000. The President gave his approval for these preparations, and the plans moved ahead. Troops were rapidly moving into the southeastern part of the U. S., equipped and prepared. Arrangements were begun to gather the over a hundred vessels that would be needed for an invasion.

We went to bed that night filled with concern and trepidation, but filled also with a sense of pride in the strength, the purposefulness, and the courage of the President of the United States. No one could predict what was in store in the days ahead, but we all felt that the President, because of his own wisdom and personal dignity, would have the support of a unified country.

(Kennedy 2001, 55-56)

After the meeting, the President, Ted Sorensen, Kenny O’Donnell, and I sat in his office and talked. “The great danger and risk in all of this,” he said, “is a miscalculation-a mistake in judgment.” A short time before, he had read Barbara Tuchman’s book The Guns of August, and he talked about the miscalculations of the Germans, the Russians, the Austrians, the French, and the British. They somehow seemed to tumble into war, he said, through stupidity, individual idiosyncrasies, misunderstandings, and personal complexes of inferiority and grandeur. We talked about the miscalculation of the Germans in 1939 and the still unfulfilled commitments and guarantees that the British had given to Poland.

Neither side wanted war over Cuba, we agreed, but it was possible that either side could take a step that –for reasons of “security” or “pride” or “face”-would require a response by the other side, which, in turn, for the same reasons of security, pride, or face, would bring about a counter response and eventually an escalation into armed conflict. That was what he wanted to avoid. He did not want anyone to be able to say that the U. S. had not done all it could to preserve the peace. We were not going to misjudge, or miscalculate, or challenge the other side needlessly, or precipitously push our adversaries into a course of action that was not intended or anticipated.

(Kennedy 2001, 62-63)

After it was finished, he made no statement attempting to take credit for himself or for the Administration for what had occurred. He instructed all members of the Ex Comm and government that no interview should be given, no statement made, which would claim any kind of victory. He respected Khrushchev for properly determining what was in his own country’s interest and what was in the interest of mankind. If it was a triumph, it was a triumph for the next generation and not for any particular government or people.

At the outbreak of the First World War the ex-Chancellor of Germany, Prince von Bülow, said to his successor, “HOW did it all happen?” “Ah, if only we knew,” was the reply.

(Kennedy 2001, 127-128)

NOTE

It was Senator Kennedy’s intention to add a discussion of the basic ethical question involved: what, if any, circumstance or justification gives this government or any government the moral right to bring its people and possibly all people under the shadow of nuclear destruction? He wrote this book in the summer and fall of 1967 on the basis of his personal diaries and recollections, but never had an opportunity to rewrite or complete it.

THEODORE C. SORENSEN

(Kennedy 2001, 128)

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References

Kennedy, Robert F. 2001. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. N.p.: G.K. Hall.

ISBN 9780783893563